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Sovereign Impunity: Why Double 
Jeopardy Should Apply in Puerto Rico   
Colin Miller* 
Abstract 
On January 13th, 2016, the Supreme Court of the United 
States heard oral arguments in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle. The 
question that the Court must decide is whether the federal 
government and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are separate 
sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. This essay 
argues that the Supreme Court cannot answer this question in the 
affirmative without overturning precedent holding that the U.S. 
government can unilaterally impose the Federal Death Penalty Act 
in Puerto Rico. In other words, the Court cannot deprive Puerto 
Rican citizens of the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
unless it adopts the concept of popular sovereignty. 
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There is no disagreement that Congress has the power to 
apply the federal criminal laws to Puerto Rico. With that 
power, of necessity, comes the power to set the penalties for 
violations of those laws. Indeed, it would be anomalous for 
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Congress to grant the people of Puerto Rico American 
citizenship and then not afford them the protection of the 
federal criminal laws.1 
I. Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereignty2  
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: 
“nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”3
 
Jeopardy attaches when the jury 
is empaneled and sworn, or, at a bench trial, when the first 
witness is sworn.4 After jeopardy attaches, a defendant cannot be 
re-prosecuted for the same act unless (1) there is “manifest 
necessity for declaring a mistrial,” such as a hung jury;5 or (2) the 
defendant is charged with violating a different statute at his 
second trial, with the statutes at each trial both requiring “proof 
of a fact which the other does not.”6 
In Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle,7 Puerto Rican prosecutors 
charged Luis Sánchez Valle and Jaime Gómez Vázquez with 
violating Commonwealth law by selling firearms—and, in the 
case of Sánchez Valle, ammunition—without a license.8 Before 
these cases went to trial, the two men were convicted in United 
States District Court based upon the same conduct.9 The men 
                                                                                                     
 1.  United States v. Acosta Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 21 (2001). 
 2. After this essay was written, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Sanchez Valle. In her majority opinion, Justice Kagan wrote that 
[F]or purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the future is not what 
matters—and there is no getting away from the past. Because the 
ultimate source of Puerto Rico’s prosecutorial power is the Federal 
Government—because when we trace that authority all the way back, 
we arrive at the doorstep of the U.S. Capitol—the Commonwealth 
and the United States are not separate sovereigns. That means the 
two governments cannot “twice put” respondents Sánchez Valle and 
Gómez Vázquez “in jeopardy” for the “same offence.” 
Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, No. 15-108, slip op. at 17–18 (S. Ct. June 9, 2016).  
 3.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 4.  Willhauck v. Flanagan, 448 U.S. 1323, 1326–27 (1980). 
 5.  Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 500 (1978). 
 6.  Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). 
 7.  192 D.P.R. 594 (P.R. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 28 (2015) (certified 
translation). 
 8.  See id. at 2a (recounting the facts of the case and the charges).  
 9.  Id. at 2a–3a. 
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then moved to dismiss their Puerto Rican prosecutions, claiming 
that they violated their rights under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.10 
The Commonwealth court agreed.11 On appeal, however, the 
Court of Appeals of Puerto Rico reversed, finding that the dual 
sovereignty doctrine applied.12 That doctrine provides that a 
defendant who committed a single act violating the “peace and 
dignity” of two sovereigns has committed two distinct “offences.”13 
Therefore, if a defendant’s single act violates the laws of two 
countries, such as France and the United States, he could be 
prosecuted in both countries successively without violating the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.14 Similarly, an act that breaks both 
federal and state law would allow for prosecutions in both federal 
and state court.15 The same holds true for a defendant who is 
court-martialed and then charged in state court or vice versa.16
 
Conversely, a defendant convicted or acquitted in federal 
court could not be court-martialed for the same conduct because 
military courts derive their authority from the federal 
government.17 The “crucial determination” in deciding whether 
the dual sovereignty doctrine applies “is whether the two entities 
                                                                                                     
 10.  Id. at 3a. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 6a. 
 13.  Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985). 
 14. See Roberto Iraola, Double Jeopardy and Sovereignty, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 
Art. 6 (2011) (“[T]he dual sovereignty doctrine applies to allow serial 
prosecutions involving the same offense by a foreign country and the United 
States . . . .”). 
 15.  See, e.g., Jim Mustian, Man Acquitted of a New Orleans Murder in 
Federal Court Wanted on State Warrant Stemming from Same Killing, NEW 
ORLEANS ADVOC. (May 28, 2015, 7:57 PM), 
http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/12495659-123/man-acquitted-of-
murder-in (last visited May 30, 2016) (discussing the case of Ryan J. Veazie, 
who is wanted in New Orleans on one count of second-degree murder but was 
already tried and acquitted of that crime in district court in 2008) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 16.  See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 12 M.J. 229, 229 (C.M.A. 1982) (“A 
general court-martial convened in Spain convicted the appellant, contrary to his 
please, of wrongful sale . . . of hashish and of conspiracy to make that 
sale . . . .”).  
 17.  See id. at 231 (noting that “trial by a court-martial is barred by the 
[Uniform] Code [of Military Justice] . . . if the accused has already been tried in 
a court which derives its authority from the Federal Government”). 
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that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the same 
course of conduct can be termed separate sovereigns.”18 In 
resolving this “crucial determination,” courts look to “whether the 
two entities draw their authority to punish the offender from 
distinct sources of power.”19
  
While the Commonwealth court answered this question in 
the affirmative in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, the Court of 
Appeals of Puerto Rico disagreed, noting that the Supreme Court 
of Puerto Rico had already held in People v. Castro García20 that 
Puerto Rico and the federal government are separate sovereigns 
for Double Jeopardy purposes.21 Moreover, Judge González 
Vargas wrote separately to emphasize that the authority for 
Puerto Rico’s criminal laws “emanates . . . from the People of 
Puerto Rico through their Constitution, which was democratically 
adopted as the ultimate expression of their will in the exercise of 
their self-government attributes.” 22 According to the judge:  
It is legally unacceptable and contrary to the dignity of 
every Puerto Rican to argue that even the adoption of 
their criminal laws and the indictment for the violation 
of same are merely the result of gifts or graces by the 
People of the United States, as if we found ourselves in 
the times of the crudest colonial regime.23
 
 
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, however, disagreed, 
repudiating its prior opinion in Castro Garcia as “clearly 
erroneous.”24 A sharply divided court concluded that “Puerto 
Rico’s authority to prosecute individuals is derived from its 
delegation by United States Congress and not by virtue of its own 
sovereignty.”25 As such, the Double Jeopardy Clause applied and 
the dual sovereignty doctrine did not.26 
                                                                                                     
 18.  Heath, 474 U.S. at 88. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  110 D.P.R. 644 (P.R. 1981). 
 21.  Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 192 D.P.R. 594 (P.R. 2015) (certified 
translation). 
 22.  Id. at 32a. 
 23.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 
U.S. __ (2016) (No. 15–108).  
 24.  Sanchez Valle, 192 D.P.R. at 69a. 
 25.  Id. at 65a. 
 26.  Id. at 68a. 
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During oral argument before the Supreme Court, the 
attorney for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico argued against 
this conclusion, claiming that  
a prior Federal conviction has no Double Jeopardy 
implications for the enforcement of the Commonwealth's 
criminal laws because Commonwealth law and Federal 
law emanate from different sources of authority: The 
people of Puerto Rico on the one hand and Congress on 
the other.27 
It’s not the first time that this argument has been made.  
II. The Death Penalty in Puerto Rico: Popular Sovereignty vs. 
Dual Sovereignty  
Between 1493 and 1898, Puerto Rico was a Spanish colony, 
and Spanish authorities regularly imposed the death penalty to 
control the slave population, establish Catholicism as the island’s 
religion, punish deserting soldiers, and maintain stability.28 
Members of the Spanish elite were able to avoid or appeal death 
sentences, unlike native Puerto Ricans, who categorically opposed 
capital punishment.29 This opposition continued after the United 
States annexed Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898.30 
Eventually, the Puerto Rico Legislature abolished the death 
penalty in 1929.31 When Puerto Rico ratified its own Constitution 
in 1952, it included a Bill of Rights, which stated in relevant part 
that “[t]he Death Penalty shall not exist.”32
 
Many have construed 
Puerto Rico’s adoption of its own Constitution as an act of 
“popular sovereignty” in which the Commonwealth exercised “a 
                                                                                                     
 27.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 
U.S. __ (2016) (No. 15–108). 
 28.  Cristina M. Quiñones-Betancourt, Note, When Standards Collide: How 
the Federal Death Penalty Fails the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
Evolving Standards of Decency Test When Applied to Puerto Rican Federal 
Capital Defendants, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 157, 178 (2013). 
 29.  Id. at 179. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 180. 
 32.  P.R. CONST art. II, § 7. 
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degree of autonomy and independence normally associated with 
States of the Union.”33
 
 
For instance, in the aforementioned Castro Garcia case, the 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico found that Puerto Rico and the 
United States were separate sovereigns because of the “doctrine 
of popular sovereignty . . . identified by Alexis de Tocqueville as 
the defining characteristic of American constitutionalism.”34 In 
1987, the First Circuit similarly ruled in United States v. López 
Andino35 that Puerto Rico was a separate sovereign for Double 
Jeopardy purposes “because its criminal laws emanate from ‘the 
people of Puerto Rico,’ who engaged in an exercise of popular 
sovereignty in 1952 by ‘organiz[ing] a government pursuant to a 
constitution of their own adoption.’”36  
This concept of popular sovereignty, however, was challenged 
in the wake of Congress’s 1994 passage of the Federal Death 
Penalty Act (FDPA).37 The FDPA greatly expanded the number of 
federal crimes that were death-eligible.38 Subsequently, in 1997, 
Representative Jorge de Castro submitted a resolution in the 
Puerto Rican legislature asking the Attorney General to declare 
Puerto Rico exempt from any application of the death penalty.39 
Meanwhile, Reverend Moses Rosa noted “both the Catholic and 
Protestant churches have strongly opposed the death penalty 
throughout the last century.”40 That said, “members of the ruling 
New Progressive Party, which seeks statehood for Puerto Rico, 
claim[ed] that the Puerto Rican constitution is a federal 
                                                                                                     
 33.  United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st
 
Cir. 1987). 
 34.  Puerto Rico v. Castro Garcia, 120 D.P.R. 740, 787 n.4 (P.R. 1988). 
 35.  831 F.2d 1164 (1st Cir.1987). 
 36.  Diaz Morales v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 15-1096, 2015 WL 
4742512 at *7 (D.P.R. 2015) (quoting United States v. López Andino, 831 F.2d 
1164, 1168, 1172 (1st Cir.1987)). 
 37.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598 (2012). 
 38.  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 423 (2008) (discussing the 
wide reach of the FDPA). 
 39.  See Puerto Rico and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 
[hereinafter Puerto Rico], http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/881 (last visited 
May 30, 2016) (detailing the history of the death penalty in Puerto Rico) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40.  Id. 
180 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 174 (2016) 
document and that there is nothing to prevent federal imposition 
of capital punishment in the territory.”41 
This conflict later played out in the courtroom when, in early 
2000, the U.S. Attorney General authorized the U.S. Attorney for 
the District of Puerto Rico to seek the death penalty against 
defendants Joel Rivera Alejandro and Hector Oscar Acosta 
Martinez in the event of a conviction.42 Rivera Alejandro and 
Acosta Martinez were charged with, inter alia, firearm murder in 
relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(j)) and killing a 
person in retaliation for providing law enforcement officials with 
information relating to the possible commission of a federal 
offense (18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B)).43 Both of these crimes were 
death-eligible under the FDPA.44 
Cristina Gutierrez, a Baltimore criminal defense attorney, 
was appointed as lead counsel in the case and submitted a brief 
arguing that the FDPA was inapplicable in Puerto Rico.45 In an 
opinion issued on July 17, 2000, the United States District Court 
for the District of Puerto Rico agreed with her.46 In United States 
v. Acosta Martinez, the court found that:  
The notion of popular sovereignty not only undergirds the 
[Federal] Constitution . . . it is also embodied in the 
Commonwealth Constitution approved by Congress, both in 
the Preamble (“We [the people of Puerto Rico] understand that 
the democratic system of government is one in which the will 
of the people is the source of public power . . . .”), and in 
Article I (“[The Commonwealth’s political power emanates 
from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with 
their will, within the terms of the compact agreed upon 
between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of 
                                                                                                     
 41.  Id. 
 42.  United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F.Supp.2d 311, 312 (D.P.R. 
2000). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See Colin Miller, Is Cristina Gutierrez Responsible for the Death Penalty 
in Puerto Rico?, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (July 29, 2015) [hereinafter Gutierrez], 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2015/07/is-cristina-gutierrez-
responsible-for-the-death-penalty-in-puerto-rico.html (last visited May 28, 2016) 
(explaining the facts surrounding the Acosta-Martinez case, and Gutierrez’s 
failure to file an appellate brief in the appeal to the First Circuit) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46.  Acosta Martinez, 106 F.Supp.2d at 311. 
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America.]”). Moreover, in approving the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth, the Constituent Convention expressed that 
upon the Constitution becoming effective, the people of Puerto 
Rico would be “organized in a commonwealth established 
within the terms of the compact entered into by mutual 
consent, which is the basis of our union with the United 
States of America.”47 
Perhaps wary of the fact that it was largely making a 
political argument, the court tried to frame its opinion as a legal 
certainty: “Although the final determination of the status of 
Puerto Rico is a political question for the Congress and the people 
of Puerto Rico to decide, the applicability of the federal death 
penalty in the Commonwealth, under the present constitutional 
arrangement, is not.”48 According to the court, the United States 
government was claiming that the death penalty applies to 
Puerto Rico citizens who are deprived of the indirect or direct 
opportunity to participate in the government that authorizes the 
death penalty.49 As such, the court held that the federal 
government’s action “shocks the conscience” and violated 
Puerto Ricans’ rights to substantive due process.50 
The court also wondered how Puerto Rican citizens could be 
tried under federal death penalty machinery for crimes 
committed solely within the Commonwealth “while at the same 
time denying them a say in the political process of the 
government that tries them.”51 Ultimately, the court found that 
capital punishment could only be imposed “on the consent of 
those whose rights may be affected by its imposition, such 
consent expressed through their participation in the political 
process as a manifestation of their free will.”52 
The United States thereafter appealed to the First Circuit. 
An attorney for Rivera Alejandro and a couple of amici filed briefs 
in support of the district court’s opinion.53 The lead attorney on 
                                                                                                     
 47.  Id. at 323. 
 48.  Id. at 325. 
 49.  Id. at 326–27. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 327. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See generally Brief of Appellee, United States v. Acosta-Martinez, No. 
00–2088, 2001 WL 36025318 (1st Cir. 2001); Brief of the Commonwealth of 
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the case, however, did not file a brief.54 In early 2001, Cristina 
Gutierrez had contracted multiple sclerosis, was on the brink of 
having a record number of client complaints brought against her, 
and had been fired and sued by her own law firm.55 On March 28, 
2001, a default order was sent to Gutierrez’s law firm, with that 
order being returned to the court by FedEx a few days later along 
with the note, “REFUSED—CO GOING OUT OF BUSINESS.”56 
Without the benefit of a brief from the lead attorney, the 
First Circuit reversed the district court’s opinion and found the 
FDPA applied in Puerto Rico.57 In doing so, the First Circuit 
rejected the concept of popular sovereignty: “The creation of the 
Commonwealth granted Puerto Rico authority over its own local 
affairs; however, ‘Congress maintains similar powers over Puerto 
Rico as it possesses over the federal states.’” 58 The court then 
found that Congress exercised that intent by passing the FDPA 
with the clear intent that it apply to crimes committed in Puerto 
Rico.59 
The First Circuit proceeded to find that the exercise of these 
powers did not “shock the conscience” and thus violate the Due 
Process Clause.60 Instead, the court noted that it had previously 
enforced a variety of Congressional statutes in Puerto Rico, 
including OSHA, the Clean Water Act, and the Defense Base 
Act.61 
                                                                                                     
Puerto Rico as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Acosta-Martinez v. 
United States, No. 01–7137, 2001 WL 34117193 (2001); Brief of Amici Curiae, 
Comisión De Derechos Civiles De Puerto Rico, Ciudadanos Contra La Pena De 
Muerte, Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico in Support of Petitioners, Acosta-
Martinez v. United States, No. 01–7137, 2002 WL 32135733 (2002). 
 54.  See Gutierrez, supra note 45 (“Acosta-Martinez’s appellate brief was 
due in March 2001. Gutierrez failed to file this brief. . . . As a result, the lead 
defendant in the case did not have his own brief.”). 
 55.  See id. (describing the events that led to Gutierrez failing to file a 
brief). 
 56. Id. 
 57.  See United States v. Acosta Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 21 (1st
 
Cir. 2001) 
(ruling that “the death penalty notice is reinstated”). 
 58.  Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 43 (1st 
Cir.1985)). 
 59.  See id. at 20 (discussing several “indicia of congressional intent to apply 
the death penalty to Puerto Rico”). 
 60. Id. 
 61.  Id. 
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The court closed its opinion with the quote that led this 
essay, noting that Congress has the authority to “apply the 
federal criminal laws to Puerto Rico,” “set the penalties for 
violations of those laws,” and afford Puerto Rican citizens “the 
protection of the federal criminal laws.”62 According to the First 
Circuit, “[t]he argument made by defendants and amici is a 
political one, not a legal one.”63 In other words, while popular 
sovereignty might be a popular political claim, it is not a legally 
cognizable one.  
The First Circuit’s decision prompted protests in Puerto Rico, 
with Puerto Rican Bar Association President Arturo Luis Davila 
Toro noting, “[w]e don't believe in capital punishment, and they 
are trying to impose it on us.”64 Ultimately, Rivera Alejandro and 
Acosta Martinez were acquitted by a Puerto Rican jury in 2003.65 
It is not “clear whether questions about the federal government's 
right to have jurisdiction in the case affected their decision.”66 
Acosta Martinez has never been overturned, but Puerto Rican 
juries have refused to impose the death penalty in all subsequent 
cases in which the federal government has brought FDPA 
prosecutions on the island.67 
                                                                                                     
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Death Penalty, supra note 39. 
 65.  See Abby Goodnough, Acquittal in Puerto Rico Averts Fight Over 
Government’s Right to Seek Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/01/us/acquittal-puerto-rico-averts-fight-over-
government-s-right-seek-death-penalty.html (last visited May 30, 2016) 
(describing how jurors acquitted two defendants in a federal death penalty case, 
elating many Puerto Ricans who believe the death penalty betrays their “culture 
and constitution, which outlaws capital punishment”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See Jury Declines to Impose Death Penalty in Puerto Rico Murders, 
REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-deathpenalty-
puertorico-idUSBRE92N02020130324 (last visited May 29 2016) (“The jury 
failed to reach a unanimous decision on a death sentence . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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III. The Tenth Amendment and Dual Sovereignty  
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico claimed in Sanchez Valle 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude successive 
federal and Commonwealth prosecutions “because 
Commonwealth law and Federal law emanate from different 
sources of authority: The people of Puerto Rico on the one hand 
and Congress on the other.”68 This invocation of the concept of 
popular sovereignty is appealing on a certain level, and the 
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 
similarly relied upon it in finding that the FDPA could not be 
applied in Puerto Rico. 69 
The First Circuit, however, overturned that conclusion, 
finding, inter alia, that “it would be anomalous for Congress to 
grant the people of Puerto Rico American citizenship and then 
not afford them the protection of the federal criminal laws.”70  
Given that the Double Jeopardy Clause is a long established 
federal criminal law,71 the easy conclusion to draw would be that 
Puerto Rican citizens are thus entitled to its protections. After 
all, how can Puerto Rico be a dual sovereign for Double Jeopardy 
purposes but a dependent sovereign for FDPA purposes?  
The obvious response to this argument is the fact that the 
FDPA applies even in states that have abolished the death 
penalty,72 despite the fact that citizens in those states can be 
prosecuted successively in federal and state court.73 Therefore, for 
instance, a New York resident could conceivably be (1) prosecuted 
                                                                                                     
 68.  Transcript of Oral Argument, at 3, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 
U.S. __ (2016) (No. 15–108).  
 69.  See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (discussing Acosta 
Martinez). 
 70.  United States v. Acosta Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 21 (1st
 
Cir. 2001). 
 71.  See, e.g., United States v. Hans, 548 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (S.D. Ohio 
1982) (“Collateral estoppel, long established as a rule of federal criminal law, 
was expressly incorporated into the scope of Fifth Amendment double jeopardy 
protections by the Supreme Court in Ashe v. Swenson.”). 
 72.  See generally Joshau Herman, Comment, Death Denies Due Process: 
Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1777 (2004) (discussing the application of the FDPA to the several 
states). 
 73.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text (detailing the Double 
Jeopardy Clause). 
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in state and federal court successively; and (2) given the death 
penalty under the FDPA even though New York abolished the 
death penalty.  
The dual sovereignty doctrine explains both of these 
outcomes. In turn, the Tenth Amendment explains the dual 
sovereignty doctrine. The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”74 The Supreme Court has referred 
to the Tenth Amendment as an explicit dual sovereignty 
provision75 and noted that Congressional statutes are 
unconstitutional if they “violate[] the principles of dual 
sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment.”76 
For instance, in New York v. United States,77 the Supreme 
Court held that Congress violated the Tenth Amendment by 
compelling New York into administering the “take title” 
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985.78 Similarly, in Printz v. United States,79 
the Supreme Court found a Tenth Amendment violation when 
Congress sought to compel state officials to perform background 
checks under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.80 
The defendant in United States v. Tavares81 tried to raise a 
similar argument after he was given a death sentence under the 
FDPA.82 This claim failed, but not because New York lacked the 
ability to make a Tenth Amendment objection; instead, the court 
noted that “[n]o official of the State of New York has objected to 
assisting the federal government in killing persons condemned to 
death in a federal criminal proceeding.”83 In rejecting a similar 
Tenth Amendment challenge in United States v. Henderson,84 the 
                                                                                                     
 74.  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 75.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 n.13 (1997). 
 76.  Pierce County, Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 148 n.10 (2003). 
 77.  505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
 78.  Id. at 188. 
 79.  521 U.S. 898. 
 80.  Id. at 935. 
 81.  No. 04-CR-156 JBW, 2006 WL 473773 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006). 
 82.  Id. at *5. 
 83.  Id. at *6. 
 84.  485 F.Supp.2d 831 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
186 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 174 (2016) 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
concluded “that dual sovereignty exists in this case, and the 
United States, with the State of Ohio's blessing, may exercise its 
sovereignty in this matter.”85
 
 
These cases illustrate how the dual sovereignty doctrine is 
defined by the Tenth Amendment.86 The FDPA applied to a New 
York citizen because no official in New York objected, and the 
FDPA applied to an Ohio citizen because Ohio gave its blessing. 
Conversely, if officials in either of these states objected, the 
FDPA might have failed a Tenth Amendment challenge, like the 
Acts in New York and Printz. This is because states and the 
federal government are dual sovereigns, meaning that the former 
can use the Tenth Amendment to challenge Congressional 
attempts to compel state officials into administering federal 
programs.  
Conversely, as the First Circuit’s opinion in Acosta Martinez 
makes clear, Puerto Rico lacked the authority to challenge 
application of the FDPA in the Commonwealth.87 This make 
sense given that the First Circuit has concluded that “[t]he limits 
of the Tenth Amendment do not apply to Puerto Rico, which is 
‘constitutionally a territory’ . . . because Puerto Rico's powers are 
not ‘[those] reserved to the States’ but those specifically granted 
to it by Congress under its constitution.”88 
This takes us back to the “crucial determination” under the 
dual sovereignty doctrine, which focuses upon “whether the two 
entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct 
sources of power.”89 As the above language makes clear, Puerto 
Rico’s authority to punish offenders is “specifically granted to it 
by Congress,”90 meaning that it is not a dual sovereign for Double 
Jeopardy purposes. Indeed, soon after the Supreme Court of 
Puerto Rico decided Sanchez Valle, the United States District 
                                                                                                     
 85.  Id. at 859. 
 86.  In re City of Harrisburg, PA, 465 B.R. 744, 753 (Bankr. M.D.Pa. 2011). 
 87.  See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing Acosta 
Martinez). 
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SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY 187 
Court for the District of Puerto Rico issued its opinion in Diaz 
Morales v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,91 concluding “that the 
Tenth Amendment does not apply to the Commonwealth and that 
the same is not a dual sovereign for double jeopardy purposes.”92 
IV. Conclusion  
In Sanchez Valle, the Commonwealth argued that the 
concept of popular sovereignty makes Puerto Rico a dual 
sovereign whose authority to enforce criminal laws emanates 
from the Puerto Rican people. If this argument held water, 
Puerto Rico would have been able to challenge the attempt to 
impose the FDPA on its citizens. The Commonwealth, however, 
was not able to do so because the Tenth Amendment does not 
apply to Puerto Rico, meaning that it is not a dual sovereign to 
the federal government. As such, the dual sovereignty doctrine 
does not apply to Puerto Rico, and the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does prevent successive prosecutions in federal court and the 
Commonwealth. 
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